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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DID CONGRESS OVERREACH IN ITS 
REACTION TO LAMP/! 
INTRODUCTION· 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and the 
accompanying rule lOb-52 have been used for over forty-five years 
to bring private actions for securities fraud claims in the federal 
courtS.3 Since neither the statute nor the accompanying regulation 
specify a statute of limitations to be applied in such cases, the fed­
eral courts traditionally "borrowed" a statute of limitations from 
the state law of the district in which the case was heard.4 However, 
by the late 1980s, some circuits had decided to establish a more 
uniform statute of limitations for these claims.5 The resulting "di­
vergence of opinion among the [c]ircuits"6 over the proper statute 
of limitations led the Supreme Court to take up the issue.7 The 
Court's resolution was to establish a uniform statute of limitations 
through its ruling in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. 
Gilbertson.8 The Court also held that this new rule was to be ap­
plied retroactively.9 
The result of the Lamp! decision was that many pending 10b-5 
cases which had been commenced in reliance on more lenient stat­
utes of limitations were suddenly time-barred. Congress took note 
of this10 and responded by passing an amendmentll to the Securi­
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 
(codified at 15 U.S.c. § 78j(b) (1988». 
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1994). 
3. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). 
4. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 355 
(1991). 
5. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991); Ceres Partners V. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990); In re 
Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 
U.S. 849 (1988). 
6. Lamp/, 501 U.S. at 354. 
7. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow V. Gilbertson, 498 U.S. 894 (1990). 
8. 501 U.S. 350 (1991). 
9. Id. at 364. The decision to apply the rule to the litigants before the Court, 
along with the Court's decision in James B. Beam Distilling CO. V. Georgia, 501 U.S. 
529 (1991), announced the same day, meant that the new rule would be applied retroac­
tively to all pending cases. 
10. 137 CONGo REC. S18624 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991). "In effect, Lamp/changed 
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ties Exchange Act reinstating those claims. The legislation, which 
was attached to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im­
provement Act of 1991, added section 27A to the Securities Ex­
change Act of 1934. Section 27A(a) declared that the applicable 
statute of limitations for claims filed prior to the Lamp! decision 
would be the statute of limitations applicable in that jurisdiction on 
the day before Lamp! was decided.12 Part (b) of the statute al­
lowed plaintiffs whose suits had been dismissed as time-barred on 
the basis of Lamp! to petition for reinstatement within sixty days,13 
Defendants in 10b-5 actions have claimed that section 27A vio­
lates the separation of powers doctrine because it represents an at­
tempt by Congress to prescribe judicial decisions14 or to exercise 
direct congressional review of judicial decisions.1s The United 
States Supreme Court has affirmed, by an equally divided vote, a 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decision holding section 
27A(b) constitutional.16 Justice O'Connor took no part in the con­
sideration or decision of the caseP Certiorari has been granted in 
another case dealing with the application of section 27A(b), how­
ever, creating another opportunity for the Court to declare whether 
section 27A is constitutional.18 
This Note will review some of the cases dealing with these 
claims. Part I will describe the background of the issue, including 
the nature of claims under section 10(b) and the federal courts' 
prior practice of borrowing the local statute of limitations in those 
suits. Part I will also review the decisions in Lampf9 and James B. 
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,20 which led to the enactment of sec­
tion 27A. Finally, Part I will examine that legislation. 
the rules in the middle of the game for thousands of fraud victims who already had suits 
pending ...." Id. (statement of Sen. Richard Bryan) 
11. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-242, § 476, 105 Stat. 2236, 2387 (1991) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-I (Supp. V 
1993». 
12. 15 U.S.c. § 78aa-l(a) (Supp. V 1993). 
13. § 78aa-l(b). 
14. See, e.g., Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993). 
15. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 1 F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. 
granted, 114 S. Ct. 2161 (1994). 
16. Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1827 (1994) (per 
curiam). 
17. Id. 
18. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 2161 (1994) granting cert. to 1 F.3d 
1487 (6th Cir. 1993). 
19. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991). 
20. 501 U.S. 529 (1991). 
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Part II of this Note will discuss the separation of powers doc­
trine and survey various approaches to separation of powers analy­
sis. In particular, Part II will address the difference between a 
proper exercise of the legislative function which changes or modi­
fies the law, and an unconstitutional prescription of a rule of deci­
sion which usurps the decision making power of the judiciary. Part 
III will discuss the decisions in Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, 
Inc.,21 and Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,22 two of the circuit court 
opinions which have focused directly on the separation of powers 
challenges to the new legislation.23 Finally, Part IV will examine 
the application of separation of powers analysis to the Henderson 
and Plaut cases and explain why section 27A is unconstitutional. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Section lOeb) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 
During the Great Depression, Congress enacted laws to pro­
vide better federal regulation of the securities markets.24 The Se­
curities Act of 193325 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193426 
outlined rules for the registration of securities with the Securities 
Exchange Commission27 and the disclosure of relevant information 
to prospective buyers and sellers of securities. 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193428 makes it 
unlawful for a person to employ "manipulative or deceptive de­
vice[s]" in connection with the purchase or sale of registered securi­
ties "in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
21. 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993). 
22. 1 F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2161 (1994). 
23. The other court of appeals opinions dealing with the constitutionality of the 
legislation are Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. First Republicbank Corp., 997 F.2d 
39 (5th Cir. 1993), affd per curiam sub nom. Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Pacific Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1827 (1994); Cooke v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 998 F.2d 1256 (4th 
Cir. 1993); Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito Aguada v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 993 
F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3299 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1993) 
(No. 93-564); Berning v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 990 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1993); Gray 
v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1993); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. 
Co., 977 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1841 (1993). 
24. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1445 (1994). 
25. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.c. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1988 & Supp. V 1993». 
26. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291,48 Stat. 881 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.c. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. V 1993». 
27. 15 V.S.c. § 78d (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988). 
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Commission may prescribe."29 The Commission later promulgated 
Rule lOb-S, which prohibits fraud, the making of untrue statements, 
and omissions of material facts that might tend to mislead any per­
son in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.30 
Although neither the statute nor the regulation expressly pro­
vide a private right of action for violations, the courts have found 
an implied private right of action under Rule lOb-S.31 Over the 
years, such actions have become "the most important antifraud pro­
tection of the entire Federal securities laws."32 Because the Securi­
ties Exchange Commission does not have adequate resources to 
detect and prosecute securities fraud, private actions to uncover 
and punish fraud are essential to safeguard the integrity of the se­
curities markets.33 
. Rule lOb-S jurisprudence was developed in the lower federal 
courts over the course of twenty-two years before the Supreme 
Court addressed the subject.34 In the years that followed, the Court 
outlined the elements of a successful lOb-S claim.35 Prior to the 
Lamp! decision, the statute of limitations in lOb-S cases was the 
29. Id. 
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1993). The regulation provides as follows: 

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 

means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security. 
Id. 
31. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947). 
32. Securities Investor Protection Act of1991: Hearings on S. 1533 Before the Sub­
comm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1991) (statement of Richard Breeden, Chairman, SEC). 
33. See id. 
34. See Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 
(1969). 
35. First, the defendant must have engaged in fraud or manipulation. Santa Fe 
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-74 (1977). Second, the defendant must have 
acted with scienter. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). Third, the 
misconduct must have related to a "material" fact. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
238 (1988). Finally, the misconduct must have occurred "in connection with" a securi­
ties transaction. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738 (1975). See 
Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 13-14, Lampf, 
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (No. 90-333). 
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subject of much confusion.36 Since Congress did not contemplate a 
private right of action under section lO(b) when it enacted section 
lOeb),37 it did not include a statute of limitations,?8 
B. Method of Determining the Statute of Limitations 
When Congress has provided no statute of limitations for a 
federal cause of action, the traditional practice of the federal courts 
is to borrow "the local time limitation most analogous to the case at 
hand."39 The Supreme Court has characterized this practice as the 
fulfillment of congressional expectations.40 Despite these solid 
roots, the practice presents problems which have led some courts to 
develop exceptions to the rule.41 For instance, state legislatures 
probably did not have the federal cause of action in mind when 
enacting the local statute of limitations.42 Therefore, a situation 
may arise where the local statute of limitations frustrates the pur­
pose of the federal statute.43 . In such a situation, the court should 
look to federal law for a more suitable statute of limitations.44 
The Lampf Court described a hierarchical analysis to be used 
as a guide in selecting the appropriate statute of limitations for a 
federal cause of action with no express statute of limitations. First, 
the court must determine whether a uniform statute of limitations is 
needed.45 The need for a uniform standard may arise because the 
federal cause of action tends to encompass a complex variety of 
topics.46 In such a situation, a particular local statute may be an 
unsatisfactory analog from which to draw a statute of limitations.47 
36. See Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Statute of Limitations and Rule lOb-5 Claims: 
A Study in Judicial Lassitude, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 235 (1989). 
37. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 196. 
38. See generally Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Se­
curities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. 385 (1990). 
39. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 355 
(1991) (citations omitted). 
40. Id. 
41. Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990) (departing from 
pre-Lampfpractice of borrowing local statute of limitations in § 10(b) cases and look­
ing instead to other provisions of the Securities Exchange Act for a suitable statute of 
limitations model); In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.) (en banc) 
(same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988). 
42. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 355. 
43. Id. at 355-56. 
44. Id. at 362. For examples of courts applying this rationale, see Ceres, 918 F.2d 
349; In re Data Access, 843 F.2d 1537, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849. 
45. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 357. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
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Second, if a uniform standard is desirable, the court must de­
termine whether the source should be state or federallaw.48 The 
possibility of multi-state litigation and the attendant risk of forum­
shopping are factors in this determination.49 Finally, the court must 
recognize the presumption that a state statute will be borrowed.50 
To overcome that presumption, the court must find a federal statute 
that is a closer fit to the federal cause of action at hand than the 
available state statutes.51 Only after analyzing these factors should 
a federal court determine the appropriate source of a statute of 
limitations. 
C. 	 The Statute of Limitations for an Alleged Section lOeb) 
Violation 
Having undertaken this analysis, the Lampf Court held that a 
uniform statute of limitations was needed for actions brought under 
section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.52 To deter­
mine the appropriate statute of limitations, the Court looked for 
indications of the enacting Congress' sentiment about a proper stat­
ute of limitations. In other words, the Lampf Court sought to un­
derstand what the Seventy-third Congress would have intended if it 
had actually contemplated the private right of action recognized by 
the federal courts. 53 The Court ruled that when "the claim asserted 
is one implied under a statute that also contains an express cause of 
action with its own time limitation, a court should look first to the 
statute of origin to ascertain the proper limitations period."54 
The Court found that other provisions of the Securities Ex­
change Act of 1934,55 which have express time limitations, and were 
enacted with the same goal in mind as section 10(b),56 provide the 
48. 	 [d. 
49. 	 [d. (citation omitted); see also In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec. Litig., 76 
F.R.D. 337 (N.D. Okla. 1975) (noting that cases involving litigants from several districts 
were consolidated pursuant to an order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation). 
50. 	 Lampf, 501 U.S. at 357. 
51. 	 [d. 
52. 	 [d. at 355. 
53. 	 [d. at 359. 
54. 	 [d. 
55. 15 U.S.c. §§ 78i, 78r (1988) (originally enacted as §§ 9(e) and 18(c) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881, 890-91, 898). 
56. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 360. Referring to the purposes of the various provisions of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Court noted that "[e]ach was intended to 
facilitate a central goal: 'to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices 
through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter 
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best analog from which to draw the statute of limitations for section 
lO(b) claims. Sections 9( e) and 18( c) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, and language of the 1934 Act which amended section 
13 of the 1933 Act, all contained an explicit limitations period of 
one year from the date the violation was discovered, or should have 
been discovered, and a limit of three years in any case from the 
actual occurrence.57 The Lamp! Court therefore adopted the one 
year and three year limitations periods for section 10(b) claims. 
The Court also held that the new rule would apply to the par­
ties in the case before it.58 This decision had the effect of creating a 
one year and three year limitations period for plaintiffs with pend­
ing section 10(b) claims.59 The applicability of the rule to pending 
claims was emphatically confirmed by Justice Souter's opinion in 
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,60 announced the same day 
as Lamp/. 
The Beam Court held that a previous interpretation of federal 
law by the Supreme Court, made applicable to the litigants in the 
case before it, was applicable retroactively to all litigants with simi­
lar pending claims,61 regardless of equitable considerations such as 
reliance on the old law.62 Therefore, plaintiffs in pending Rule lOb­
S cases were bound by the Court's ruling in Lamp/. The Lamp! 
markets.'" Id. at 360-61 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 
(1976». But see Securities Investor Protection Act of1991: Hearings on S. 1533 Before 
the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af­
fairs, l02d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1991) (statement of Richard Breeden, Chairman, SEC) 
(noting that §§ 9(e) and 18(c), from which the Court drew its adopted statute of limita­
tions, are rarely used and comparatively unimportant). 
57. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 359-60. 
58. Id. at 364. 
59. Id. at 370 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
60. 501 U.S. 529 (1991). 
61. Id. at 544. Beam dealt with a claim that Georgia's state excise tax on im­
ported liquors violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Court held that its prior decision in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. 
v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (invalidating an exemption from Hawaii's liquor tax given 
to a locally produced product), applied to the plaintiffs claim for a refund of Georgia 
excise taxes paid for the years 1982, 1983, and 1984. Beam, 501 U.S. at 533-34. The 
Court reversed the Georgia Supreme Court's decision denying the plaintiffs claim, say­
ing that the principles of equality and stare decisis must prevail over equitable consider­
ations. Id. at 540. In effect, the Court stated that its 1984 decision in Bacchus would 
control the disposition of a claim arising from events which antedated that decision. 
The Court stated that the practice of making its decisions fully retroactive "reflects the 
declaratory theory of law, ... according to which the courts are understood only to find 
the law, not to make it." Id. at 535-36 (citations omitted). 
62. Beam, 501 U.S. at 540. By discounting equitable considerations, the Court 
turned away from the test for nonretroactive application of its decisions that had been 
articulated in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). The Chevron test required 
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Court also made it clear that an equitable tolling of the statute of 
limitations was not permissible in 10b-5 cases,63 and that the limit of 
three years from the occurrence of the fraud or misrepresentation 
was an absolute maximum.64 
All at once, plaintiffs across the country who had filed suit in 
reliance on their forum's local statute of limitations65 were time­
barred from asserting their claims. Defendants in 10b-5 suits filed 
for summary judgment on the basis of the more restrictive uniform 
federal statute of limitations and the cases were dismissed.66 
D. The Congressional Response. to Lampf 
The congressional response to the Lamp! ruling was the pas­
sage of an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at­
tached to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act of 1991.67 Section 476 of that Act amended the Securities Ex-
the Court to consider "the inequity imposed by retroactive application" of a new princi­
ple of law. Id. at 107. 
63. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363 
(1991). 
64. Id. Thus, unlike some lower courts in the Second and Seventh Circuits, the 
Lamp! Court left plaintiffs who had filed suit in reliance on the old law with no escape 
hatch. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 
918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990), and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Short 
v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 
(1991), had also adopted a statute of limitations based on the Securities Exchange Act 
analogs. Nevertheless, at least some district courts in those circuits had held that the 
one and three year limits adopted by the courts of appeals were not to be given retroac­
tive effect when equitable concerns, such as reliance on the old statute, justified excep­
tions. See Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Bankard v. First 
Carolina Communications, Inc., No. 89-8571, 1992 WL 3694 (N.D. Ill. January 6, 1992). 
65. Prior to Lamp!, federal courts adopted the local statute of limitations most 
closely analogous to the case at hand. Lamp!, 501 U.S. at 355. These statutes were 
usually borrowed from the local fraud statutes or the local blue-sky laws. Denise 
Rodosevich, Comment, Obtaining Uniformity for Section IO(b) and Rule IOb-5 Causes 
of Action, 22 CONN. L. REV. 525, 529 (1990). Therefore, the statute of limitations ap­
plied to lOb-5 cases varied from one to ten years depending on the jurisdiction. Id. at 
559. 
66. See, e.g., Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992); 
Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 
1841 (1993); Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
67. Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 476, 105 Stat. 2236, 2387 (1991) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78aa-1 (Supp. V 1993». § 476 of the Act added the following to the Securities Ex­
change Act of 1934: 
Sec. 27A. (a) EFFECf ON PENDING CAUSES OF ACfION.-The limitation 
period for any private civil action implied under section 10(b) of this Act that 
was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall be the limitation period 
provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of ret­
roactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991. 
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change Act of 1934 by adding section 27A. 
In substance, part (a) of this legislation directed that for all 
pending cases filed prior to the decision in Lamp/, the statute of 
limitations in effect in each respective district on the day before the 
Lamp! decision was to be applied. Part (b) of the legislation di­
rected the reinstatement of any claims which had been dismissed as 
time barred as a consequence of the Lamp! decision. Plaintiffs in 
these dismissed suits were given sixty days in which to apply for 
reinstatement. 
Concern over the Lamp! decision was tied partly to the public 
perception that the decision would, in effect, insulate some of the 
more notorious alleged perpetrators of securities fraud in the 1980s, 
including Michael Milken and Charles Keating, from lOb-5 claims.68 
While this concern over the notorious cases may have been partly 
responsible for the relatively quick congressional response, the 
more serious concern was that the time limits adopted by the 
Lamp! Court were simply inadequate to allow the timely detection 
of elaborate securities fraud schemes by private investors.69 Even 
the Securities Exchange Commission, with its many staff and legal 
resources, is not able to effectively police the securities industry.70 
(b) EFFECT ON DISMISSED CAUSES OF ACfION.-Any private civil action 
implied under section lO(b) of this Act that was commenced on or before June 
19, 1991­
(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991, 
and 
(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation period 
provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of 
retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, 
shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days after the 
date of enactment of this section. 
Id. 
68. See Kevin G. Salwen, Senate Bill Would Revive Securities Suits Dismissed 
Under Supreme Court Ruling, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1991, at A6. 
69. Securities Investor Protection Act of1991: Hearings on S. 1533 Before the Sub­
comm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1991) (statement of Richard Breeden, Chairman, SEC). For exam­
ple, a "Ponzi" scheme involves the selling of investment shares in a particular project 
with the promise of regular returns on the investment. With the sale of new shares to 
additional investors, the organizers of the scheme can pay dividends without having 
actually purchased any investment assets. For a long period of time, as long as the 
scheme is able to attract sufficient additional investment capital, the organizers can 
keep investors in the dark about the fraud. See Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 
F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1841 (1993). 
70. Securities Investor Protection Act of1991: Hearings on S. 1533 Before the Sub­
comm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1991) (statement of Richard Breeden, Chairman, SEC). 
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The private investor is at an even greater relative disadvantage.71 
Initially, a bill was proposed which would have changed the 
statute of limitations in lOb-5 cases prospectively as well as retroac­
tively,72 but a compromise dropping the pro~pective sections was 
finally adopted. The earlier bill, S. 1533, would have established a 
statute of limitations in 10b-5 cases of two years from the date of 
discovery, with an absolute maximum, or period of repose, of five 
years from the actual events constituting the fraud or misrepresen­
tation.73 The bill was accepted and recommended for passage by 
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
but opposition quickly developed from the accounting, banking, in­
surance, and securities industries.74 Representatives of these 
groups argued that the expansion of the statute of limitations would 
invite an increase of frivolous lawsuits, resulting in greater transac­
tional costs in the securities markets and a decrease in the markets' 
ability to produce the capital required by our economy.7S 
These arguments, made on behalf of the affected industries 
rather than individual defendants, did not evoke separation of pow­
ers concerns with the legislation. After the passage of section 27A, 
however, defendants who were adversely affected by the change in 
the statute of limitations argued that the new law violated separa­
tion of powers.76 
II. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 
A. The Constitutional Principle 
Despite the fact that separation of powers is not mentioned in 
the Constitution, it is a fundamental principle of American constitu­
tional law.77 Nevertheless, while our system of government de­
71. Id. 
72. S. 1533, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). 
73. Id. 
74. Securities Investor Protection Act of1991: Hearings on S. 1533 Before the Sub­
comm. on Securities ofthe Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
75. Id. at 153-202 (statement of Harvey L. Pitt, American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants; statement of Edward O'Brien, President, Securities Industry As­
soc.; statement of Austin W. Stedham, National Association of Corporate Directors). 
76. See, e.g., Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992). 
77. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,725 (1986). "'The fundamental necessity 
of maintaining each of the three general departments of government entirely free from 
the control ... of the others ... is hardly open to serious question. So much is implied 
in the very fact of the separation of the powers of these departments by the Constitu­
tion ....'" Id. (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935». 
See also Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea of Inde­
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pends on the successful maintenance of separation of powers, this 
does not mean that a complete division between the workings of 
the executive, legislative and judicial branches is required.78 In fact, 
to maintai~ a balance of shared power among the three branches, 
and thereby prevent the concentration of too much power in one 
branch, each branch must exercise a measure of review and control 
over the others.19 This is the notion of "checks and balances. "80 
The ability to carry out these "checks and balances" is often cited as 
the raison d'etre of the separation of powers. Other theories ad­
vanced in support of the separation of powers principle include the 
efficiency theory81 and the legitimacy theory.82 
The efficiency theory is built upon the notion that it is impracti­
cal to expect a monolithic government to be able to carry out the 
various functions of governing a large country. The inefficiency of 
the United States government under the Articles of Confederation 
is thought to have influenced the Framers of the Constitution to 
separate and devolve responsibilities in the interest of getting things 
done.83 
The legitimacy theory was also "a matter of great concern to 
legal theorists in the various ratifying conventions."84 The legiti­
pendence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 301 (1989). But cf Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme 
Court and the Separation of Powers: A Welcome Return to Normalcy?, 58 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 668, 710-11 (1990) (arguing that separation of powers concerns alone can never 
be enough to invalidate a statute). 
78. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693-94 (1988). "[W]e have never held that 
the Constitution requires that the three branches of Government 'operate with absolute 
independence.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974)). See 
also Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern": The Need for 
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 462 (1991). 
79. "[U]nless these departments be so far connected and blended, as to give to 
each a constitutional controul over the others, the degree of separation which the 
maxim requires as essential to a free government, can never in practice, be duly main­
tained." THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
80. Id. It is with this delicate balance between control and deference in mind that 
the courts have applied the principle that they must construe legislation as constitu­
tional if at all possible. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast 
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). Yet the courts must also 
carry out their duty to interpret the law, and in so doing, must avoid "disingenuous 
evasion" to find a statute constitutional. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985) 
(citing Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933)). 
81. GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 109 (1981). 
82. [d. at 114-15. Wills points out that the modem conception of separation of 
powers has little room for these other principles. Id. at 110. 
83. But see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965). "This 'separation of 
powers' was obviously not instituted with the idea that it would promote governmental 
efficiency." Id. 
84. WILLS, supra note 81, at 114. 
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macy of the new government, and of governments in general, was 
thought to depend on the accountability of the government, safe­
guarded by separation of powers. In the late twentieth century, 
however, it requires some exercise of the imagination to appreciate 
the significance of the legitimacy theory for a late eighteenth-cen­
tury citizen. 
B. Different Approaches to Separation of Powers Analysis 
Approaches to separation of powers analysis vary from a 
strictly formal approach85 to a more functional approach.86 The 
formal approach focuses on the maintenance of the divisions be­
tween the branches, based either on an originalist understanding of 
the proper roles of the branches87 or an evolving notion of the 
proper role of the branches. Commentators have pointed to the 
Supreme Court's decisions and reasoning in Bowsher v. SynarB8 and 
INS v. Chadha89 as examples of the formalist approach.90 
This approach suggests that nothing but strict adherence to the 
structural contours of separation of powers will be sufficient to pro­
tect against the danger inherent in the accretion of power to any 
branch in excess of some constitutionally permissible level.91 
Under the formalist view, any act or practice that usurps the power 
of another branch of government is an impermissible violation of 
separation of powers. Separation of powers analysis cannot be 
solely concerned with the end result of a disputed act or practice, 
i.e. whether or not an adequate balance of power remains; it is just 
as much a matter of structure.92 In other words, if the doctrine is to 
85. See Arthur C. Leahy, Note, Mistretta v. United States: Mistreating the Sepa­
ration of Powers Doctrine?, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 209 (1990). 
86. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 78. 
87. See Stephen L. Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subse­
quent De-Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 719 (1987). 
88. 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (striking down a provision of the Gramm-Rudman-Hol­
lings Act because it required the Comptroller General, who may be removed by Con­
gress, to exercise executive power in trimming the federal budget). 
89. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding a provision of the Immigration and Naturaliza­
tion Act unconstitutional because it gave either chamber of Congress veto power over a 
suspension of deportation, without requiring approval by the other chamber or the 
President). 
90. See Leahy, supra note 85, at 220 n.98. But see Keith Werhan, Toward an Ec­
lectic Approach to Separation of Powers: Morrison v. Olson Examined, 16 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 393, 406-10 (1989) (arguing that Bowsher does not represent a strictly for­
mal approach). 
91. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 730. "The Framers recognized that, in the long term, 
structural protections against abuse of power were critical to preserving liberty." Id. 
92. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 86, at 451. 
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deliver the protection envisioned by the drafters of the Constitution 
it must be defended as a structural limitation regardless of the ac­
tual harm done by a particular overreaching act. 
Even if there is only minimal actual harm, the usurpation of 
power must be invalidated. For instance, even though Congress 
might function more efficiently by taking short cuts with the legisla­
tive process, Congress may not legislate without presenting a bill 
for the President's signature.93 "[T]he fact that a given law or pro­
cedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of 
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the 
Constitution."94 
On the other hand, a functionalist approach focuses on the ulti­
mate impact of a particular act or practice under review, rather than 
the structural violations which are. important to a formalist analy­
sis.95 The key question in a functional analysis is whether the act or 
practice results in an unacceptable accretion of power to one of the 
branches.96 Theoretically, under this approach the practice in ques­
tion might be an overt exercise by one branch of the power re­
served to another, yet pass the separation of powers test as long as 
the consequences of the practice do not pose a threat to the future 
independence of any branch.97 Examples of this approach are the 
more recent Supreme Court decisions in Morrison v. Olson98 and 
Mistretta v. United States.99 
In Morrison, the Court recognized that the power to terminate 
the office of the independent counsel (investigating ethical viola­
tions by members of the executive branch), given to the Special Di­
vision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia by the 
Ethics in Government Act of 1978,100 was more administrative than 
judicial.101 Nonetheless, the Court was able to accept this, partly 
because it represented an insignificant encroachment on the execu­
93. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
94. [d. at 944. 
95. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 78, at 490-91. 
96. [d. 
97. [d. at 491. 
98. 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the independent counsel provisions of the 
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 against a separation of powers challenge based on 
the infringement of the President's power to remove executive officers and to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion). . 
99. 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding sentencing guidelines promulgated by the 
United States Sentencing Commission against a separation of powers challenge). 
100. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 
(1988 & Supp. V 1993». 
101. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 682 (1988). 
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tive power.102 
The Mistretta Court dealt with a constitutional challenge to the 
involvement of federal judges as members of the United States Sen­
tencing Commission. The Mistretta Court noted that the "concern 
of encroachment and aggrandizement ... animated our separation­
of-powers jurisprudence" while "[b]y the same token, ... [the 
Court has] upheld statutory provisions that to some degree com­
mingle the functions of the Branches, but that pose no danger of 
either aggrandizement or encroachment."lo3 
In Mistretta,l04 Congress arguably delegated certain legislative 
responsibilities to the judiciary; and yet the Court held that this 
sharing of responsibilities was permissible.to5 After all, it makes 
sense for the judicial branch, with its experience in imposing 
sentences, to help create the rules for sentencing. The Court recog­
nized that the executive and the judicial branches could share re­
sponsibility for developing sentencing rules without threatening the 
coordinate status of either branch. 
The categorization of an act or practice as the proper function 
of one branch is not always easy.t°6 The actions of one branch can 
sometimes bear a strong resemblance to the recognized functions of 
another. The Court, through its ability to interpret the laws, and 
Congress, through its ability to legislate, share the power to create 
law. When the Supreme Court has declared a retroactive statute of 
limitations applicable to a certain class of cases, and Congress then 
reverses the effect of that decision, is Congress simply legislating 
the statute of limitations, or is it prescribing a rule of decision in 
particular cases and usurping the judicial power? 
C. 	 The Difference Between a Change in the Law and the 
Prescription of a Rule of Decision 
IIi United States v. Klein,lo7 the Supreme Court held that con­
gressional prescription of a rule of decision in a pending case vio­
102. Id. "[T]he real question is whether the removal restrictions are of such a 
nature that they impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty, and 
the functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that light." Id. at 691. 
103. 	 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989). 
104. 	 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
105. 	 Id. at 412. 
106. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 749 (1986). "One reason that the exer­
cise of legislative, executive, and judicial powers cannot be categorically distributed 
among three mutually exclusive branches of Government is that governmental power 
cannot always be readily characterized with only one of those three labels." Id. 
107. 	 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). 
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lated the separation of powers doctrine.lOS Klein involved a 
plaintiff seeking payment from the United States Treasury for cot­
ton which had been seized and sold by the Union government dur­
ing the Civil War.109 In a prior case with similar facts,110 the Court 
had determined that a Presidential pardon "cured" participation in 
the rebellion, clearing the way for claimants to recover the property 
they lost in the war. Shortly thereafter, a proviso attached to an 
appropriations bill111 declared that pardons would henceforth be 
deemed inadmissible as evidence of a rightful claim. The proviso 
further declared that the existence of an uncontroverted pardon 
would be taken as evidence of participation in the rebellion, rather 
than as evidence of innocence.1l2 The Klein Court held that this 
proviso went too far. It characterized the legislative action as the 
prescription of a "rule for the decision of a cause in a particular 
way."1l3 If Congress were allowed to usurp the judicial power to 
decide cases, then the judiciary would cease to operate as an in­
dependent and coordinate branch within the federal system. 
The Court went on to distinguish its rule in Klein from a prior 
holding in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge CO.1l4 In 
an earlier proceeding, the Court had ruled that a certain low bridge 
over the Ohio River, which obstructed steamboat traffic, was a pub­
lic nuisance that must be abated.lls Congress reacted to the Court's 
decision with a law making the bridge a part of the post road sys­
tem,116 thereby protecting it from the action called for in the 
Court's earlier decision. The Court found that this was a change in 
the underlying law governing its decision rather than the prescrip­
tion of a rule of decision.1l7 While the change in the law did not 
affect recovery for past damages, it changed the legal status of the 
bridge henceforth. 
In both Klein and Wheeling Bridge, legislative action effected a 
reversal of a prior decision of the Supreme Court. The legislative 
action was given effect by the passage of a statute in both houses of 
108. Id. at 147-48. 
109. Id. at 136. 
110. United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869). 
111. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235. 
112. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 144. 
113. Id. at 146. 
114. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855). 
115. Id. at 429. 
116. Act of Aug. 31, 1852, ch. Ill, §§ 6, 7, 10 Stat. 110, 112. 
117. Wheeling Bridge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431-32. 
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Congress,l1S yet'the Klein Court looked through the procedural 
characteristics indicating that this was a valid change in the law. 
The Klein Court interpreted the language of the proviso as the pre­
scription of a rule of decision, unconstitutional and impermissible, 
rather than a valid change in the law.119 To illustrate the point by 
contrast, the Court referred to the legislative action in Wheeling 
Bridge. The Court characterized the congressional action in that 
case as a valid change in the law, leaving the Court to apply the new 
rule created by the legislative branch, in accord with its duties to 
interpret and apply the existing law.120 
One hundred and twenty years later, the Court revisited 
Wheeling Bridge in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society.l2l Rob­
ertson involved the famous spotted owls of the Northwestern old 
growth forests. The case consolidated claims made by two environ­
mental groups122 alleging the violation of five federal environmen­
tal statutes.123 The environmental groups believed that by failing to 
carry out the provisions of certain federal environmental protection 
statutes, the Department of the Interior was not adequately pro­
tecting the wildlife resources of the forests.124 On the other side 
were timber industry groups,125 arguing that the environmental pro­
tection statutes and Bureau of Land Management policies were cre­
ating excessive burdens for the timber industry. Congress 
intervened by passing a law popularly known as the Northwest Tim­
118. In Klein, the relevant statute was passed as a proviso to an appropriations 
bill which became law on July 12, 1870. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235. 
119. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871). The Court also 
condemned the congressional directive to view the presidential pardons in evidence in a 
manner contrary to the Court's previous decisions, but on the basis of legislative en­
croachment on the executive power. [d. at 147-48. 
120. Id. at 146-47. 
121. 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992). 
122. The Seattle Audubon Society and the Portland Audubon Society made the 
claims. Id. at 1410. 
123. Id. The statutes in question were: the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 
40 Stat. 755, ch.128 (1918) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1988 & Supp. 
V 1993»; the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.c. §§ 4321-4370 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992»; the National Forest 
Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1600-1687 (1988 & Supp. V 1993»; the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 
1976 (FLPMA), 90 Stat. 2744 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.c. §§ 1701-1784 (1988 & 
Supp. IV 1992»; and the Oregon-California Railroad Land Grant Act (OCLA), 50 
Stat. 874 (1937) (codified at 43 U.S.c. § 1181 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992». [d. 
124. Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1410. 
125. The timber industry groups were the Northwest Forest Resource Council 
and the Washington Contract Loggers Association. Id.; Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Rob­
ertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1990). . 
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ber Compromise.126 The Compromise established rules requiring 
the designation of certain areas as spotted owl habitats and regulat­
ing timber sales in those areas for a period of time.127 The legisla­
tion also declared that the Robertson defendants' compliance with 
these provisions would eliminate any liability for the federal law 
claims raised by the plaintiffs in the consolidated lawsuits.128 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit labelled the legisla­
tion a violation of the separation of powers docti'ine.129 The court 
said that "the critical distinction ... is between the actual repeal or 
amendment of the law underlying the litigation, which is permissi­
ble, and the actual direction of a particular decision in a case, with­
out repealing or amending the law underlying the litigation, which 
is not permissible."130 While the former is clearly an exercise of the 
legislative power, the latter usurps the judicial power. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit on this basis. It held that the Northwest Timber Com­
promise did in fact amend the applicable law, by the "operation of 
the canon [of construction] that specific provisions qualify general 
ones."131 While Congress did not directly amend the statute under­
lying the controversy, the Court held that the separate legislation 
governing the meaning of specific provisions of the underlying leg­
islation had the effect of amending the law. Resting its conclusion 
on the proposition that the Compromise was a change in the under­
lying law, the Court declined to consider whether the Klein decision 
requires the invalidation of a statute directing the decision in a case 
"without amending any law."132 
III. ApPELLATE COURT CASES DEALING WITH THE NEW 
LEGISLATION 
To date, nine United States courts of appeals have addressed 
the constitutionality of section 27A.133 Eight of the courts have 
126. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. 
L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 745 (1989). 
127. Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1411 n.1. 
128. [d. at 1411 n.2. 
129. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 914 F.2d at 1317. 
130. [d. at 1315. 
131. Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1414. 
132. [d. 
133. Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 6 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 1993); Plaut 
v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 1 F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2161 
(1994); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First Republicbank, 997 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1993), 
affd per curiam sub nom. Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 
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held that section 27A is a permissible exercise of congressional 
power; only one has found section 27A unconstitutional.134 All of 
these decisions (except two that simply adopted other courts' rea­
soning without elaboration)135 addressed the constitutionality of 
section 27A from several perspectives. Among the challenges to 
section 27A have been claims that the legislation violates the equal 
protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.136 Some 
have also argued that the legislation violates the rule against selec­
tive prospectivity articulated by the United States Supreme Court 
in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,137 and that the prohibi­
tion of selective prospectivity is constitutionally based.138 These 
challenges are beyond the scope of this Note. The focus of this 
Note is on the separation of powers challenge to section 27A. 
A. The Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.139 Decision 
In Henderson, a class action suit, the plaintiffs represented 
some forty thousand investors who alleged that the defendant, Sci­
entific-Atlanta, made fraudulent statements and material omissions 
which artificially inflated the price of its stoCk.l40 The plaintiffs 
claimed that they lost over $370 million as a result.141 While the 
case was awaiting trial, the Supreme Court issued the Lamp! deci­
sion. Scientific-Atlanta then filed a motion for summary judgment, 
which was granted,142 The plaintiffs then filed a notice of appeal, 
and while the appeal was pending, Congress enacted the Federal 
1827 (1994); Cooke v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 998 F.2d 1256 (4th Cir. 1993); Coop­
erativa de Ahorro y Credito Aguada v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 993 F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 
1993), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3299 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1993) (No. 93-564); Bern­
ing v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 990 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1993); Gray v. First Winthrop 
Corp., 989 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1993); Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 
1567 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. 
Co., 977 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1841 (1993). 
134. Plaut V. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 1 F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 
S. Ct. 2161 (1994). 
135. Cooke V. Manufactured Homes, Inc. 998 F.2d 1256 (4th Cir. 1993); Coopera­
tiva de Ahorro y Credito Aguada V. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 993 F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 
1993). 
136. Axel Johnson, Inc., 6 F.3d at 83; Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 997 F.2d at 46; 
Gray, 989 F.2d at 1572; Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1573-74. 
137. 501 U.S. 529 (1991). 
138. Berning V. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 990 F.2d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 1993); 
Gray V. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564, 1572 (9th Cir. 1993). 
139. 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992). 
140. Id. at 1569. 
141. Id. 
142. Robert L. Vining, Jr., J., Henderson V. Scientific-Atlanta, No.1:88-cv-2208­
RLV, (N.D. Ga.). 
415 1994] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.143 The 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit then vacated the district 
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant. The Hender­
son decision, therefore, dealt with the application of section 27A(a). 
1. The Henderson Majority 
The majority in Henderson viewed the enactment of section 
27A as a proper exercise of the legislature's prerogative under the 
Constitution to overrule a statutory construction of the Supreme 
Court. The court compared Congress' action in this context to its 
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,144 overruling the 
Supreme Court's decisions in a series of civil rights cases.145 
The Henderson court addressed two arguments that section 
27A was an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine. The first argument was that section 27A sought to render 
the Lamp! decision "a nullity as a binding precedent on the lower 
federal courts"146 and thereby violated the separation of powers 
doctrine. The court rather quickly dismissed this contention with 
the answer that such action is in fact the proper constitutional role 
of Congress.147 The court referred to the Civil Rights Act of 
1991148 as an example of a similar legislative overruling of Supreme 
Court statutory construction.149 
The second argument hinged on the inquiry as to whether or 
not Congress in fact changed the underlying law. This question was 
crystallized as part of separation of powers jurisprudence in United 
143. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-242, § 476, 105 Stat. 2236, 2387 (1991) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-I (Supp. V 
1993». 
144. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1571 n.4. The express purpose of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 was to reverse the effects of a series of Supreme Court interpretations of 
the civil rights statutes. See generally Michele A. Estrin, Retroactive Application of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pending Cases, 90 MICH. L. REv. 2035 (1992). 
145. Independent Fed'n. of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989); Pat­
terson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 
490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Craw­
ford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 
478 U.S. 310 (1986); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986). 
146. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1571. 
147. Id. 
148. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
149. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1571 n.4. 
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States v. Klein.150 The Henderson majority held that Congress had 
not attempted to force the courts to reach an outcome contrary to 
law, but that Congress had in fact changed the law.l5l The Hender­
son court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Robertson v. 
Seattle Audubon SocietyI52 to support its view. In Robertson, Con­
gress had addressed a particular lawsuit and declared that compli­
ance with newly enacted legislation would satisfy the laws upon 
which the plaintiffs based their claims in the existing suit. The 
Court found this to be a permissible change in the underlying 
law.153 
The Eleventh Circuit also found it insignificant that section 
27A had only retroactive effect, whereas the statute at issue in Rob­
ertson had both retroactive and prospective effect.154 Finally, the 
court held that section 27A did not impose a rule of decision on the 
courts, but allowed the courts to exercise the judicial function of 
fact finding and applying the changed law to those facts.155 
2. The Henderson Dissent 
Judge Wellford's dissenting OpInIOn in Henderson disagreed 
with the majority's conclusion that the legislation at issue did not 
violate the separation of powers doctrine. The dissent was "per­
suaded that Congress infringed upon judicial authority by setting 
out specific rules of decision in pending cases ... as proscribed in 
United States v. Klein." 156 
Judge Wellford also referred to what he estimated to be a ma­
jority of the district courts that had ruled on this issue and found 
the statute unconstitutional.157 Among these cases were Bank of 
Denver v. Southeastern Capital GroupI58 and Johnston v. CIGNA 
Corp.159 In Bank of Denver, the district court elaborated on the 
150. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871); see supra notes 107-32 and accompanying text 
for an explanation of the relevance of Klein. 
151. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1573. 
152. 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992). 
153. Id. See supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
Robertson decision. 
154. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1573-74. 
155. Id. The court also examined and rejected arguments that § 27A was uncon­
stitutional based on due process and equal protection requirements, but these are be­
yond the scope of this Note. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
156. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1576 (Wellford, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
157. Id. at 1575. 
158. 789 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Colo. 1992). 
159. 789 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Colo. 1992), affd, 14 F.3d 486 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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distinction between Klein and Wheeling Bridge.160 The central part 
of the distinction is that Congress may change the underlying law 
(as it did in Wheeling Bridge),161 but may not leave existing law 
undisturbed while prescribing the effect it is to be given in the 
courts (as in Klein).162 The Bank of Denver court emphasized that 
Congress could have directly amended section lO(b) to impose the 
desired result, but it did not, and probably could not, because it 
could not agree on the desired change.163 
In Johnston, the same court that decided Bank of Denver held 
that the Robertson decision did not alter the interpretation of sec­
tion 27A either, since the legislation at issue in Robertsonl64 was a 
rewriting of the "statutory framework."165 In both Bank of Denver 
and Johnston, the court emphasized the general threat to separation 
of powers doctrine posed by the new legislation, which in the 
court's view was "an encroachment on the quintessential constitu­
tional attribute of the judiciary-the power to interpret the 
laws."166 
B. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.167 
The Plaut plaintiffs were investors in "one of [Kentucky's] pre­
mier thoroughbred horse farms."168 The owners of the farm, and 
certain of their legal and financial advisors, were the defendants.169 
The plaintiffs purchased their shares in the farm in 1983. The suit 
was brought in 1987. 
Before the case came to trial, the Lamp! Court had established 
the three year limit on the commencement of actions under Rule 
lOb-5. Therefore, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit 
with prejudice on August 13, 1991.170 The plaintiffs did not appeal, 
because they believed that an appeal would have been sanctionable 
as frivolous, given the Lampfruling.l7l In November of 1991, when 
160. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text. 
162. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). 
163. Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, 789 F. Supp. 1092, 1094 (D. 
Colo. 1992). 
164. Northwest Timber Compromise, Department of the Interior and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 745 (1989). 
165. Johnston v. CIGNA Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (D. Colo. 1992). 
166. [d. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
167. 1 F.3d 1487 (6th.Cir. 1993). 
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Congress enacted section 27A, the time allowed for filing an appeal 
in the Plaut case had already expired. Because of this factual dis­
tinction, the Plaut court focused on part (b) of section 27A, which 
gave the plaintiffs the opportunity to reopen their case. The court 
determined that because part (b) of section 27A allowed the re­
opening of dismissed cases, it violated separation of powers 
principles.172 
Perhaps not surprisingly, in light of its concern for protecting 
the finality of settled questions, the Plaut court reached back to the 
eighteenth century for support of its views on separation of the leg­
islative and judicial powers. The court outlined the widespread 
practice of legislative review of judicial decisions in the colonial pe­
riod,173 culminating in "the escalation of legislative interference in 
private disputes which occurred during the time of the Articles of 
Confederation."174 Partly in reaction to this widespread practice, 
the Framers adopted the separated powers principle. The state­
ment of the crucial underlying concern is attributed to Montes­
quieu: "'Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the 
life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, 
for the judge would then be the legislator."'175 
The Plaut court then described an early test of the separation 
of powers, Rayburn's Case.176 After the Revolutionary War, Con­
gress made pensions available to disabled veterans. The federal 
courts were to accept applications for these benefits and determine 
whether the applicants were indeed veterans and disabled. How­
ever, the courts' decisions were reviewable by the Secretary of 
War.177 In other words, Congress had given the power to overrule 
the federal courts to a member of the executive branch. The fed­
eral courts declined to carry out this duty, and three of the circuit 
courts informed President Washington of their concerns in the form 
of letters, which were later appended to the reported decision in 
Rayburn's Case. 178 "This result was in essence the Court's first in­
172. Id. at 1490. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 149l. 
175. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison». Montesquieu's 
statement originally appeared in THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, Volume I, Book IX. 
176. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). For a thorough discussion of the factual back­
ground of Hayburn's Case, see Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn's Case: A Mis­
interpretation of Precedent, 1988 WIS. L. REv. 527,529-41 (1988). 
177. Plaut, 1 F.3d at 1492. 
178. The case is reported in the United States Reporter because Justices of the 
Court were "riding circuit" at that time. Hayburn's Case came as a writ of mandamus 
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validation of an act of Congress."179 
The Plaut court read Hayburn's Case as establishing a clear un­
derstanding that retroactive disturbance of final judgments of the 
federal courts is prohibited.18o While Congress has the undisputed 
power to change the law, even as it applies to pending cases, Con­
gress may not upset the prior application of those laws by the 
courts. 
Since the dismissal of a case as time-barred is a final judg­
ment,181 subsequent legislation may not reverse that judgment. Be­
cause section 27A(b) seeks to do precisely that, it is an 
"unconstitutional usurpation of the judiciary power."182 
IV. ApPLYING SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCEPTS TO 
Henderson183 and Plautl84 
A. The Klein185 Rule 
The United States courts of appeals are in agreement that part 
(a) of section 27A represents legitimate legislative change rather 
than a prescribed rule of decision.186 This view is informed by the 
Supreme Court's decision in Robertson.187 If the legislation at issue 
in Robertson was a permissible exercise of the legislative function 
even though it specifically addressed claims in two cases pending 
appeal, then it would seem that section 27A cannot be condemned 
because the intent of Congress was to address the claims of particu­
lar litigants in certain cases pending appeal. The Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit held that section 27A, unlike the legislation at 
issue in Klein, "did not 'direct any particular findings of fact or ap­
plications of law, old or new, to fact."'l88 
to the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, commanding the court to proceed 
in processing William Haybum's application for veteran's benefits. The writ was ren­
dered moot when Congress amended the procedure for determining pension eligibility. 
Hayburn's Case,2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409-10. 
179. Plaut, 1 F.3d at 1492. 
180. Id. at 1493. 
181. Id. at 1495-96. 
182. Id. at 1499. 
183. 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992). 
184. 1 F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993). 
185. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). 
186. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text. 
187. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992). 
188. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533, 1545 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(quoting Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992». 
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Congress has the power to enact laws,189 but it is for the courts 
to decide the outcome of cases,190 Nevertheless, laws enacted by 
Congress may be given retroactive effect.191 If such a law is passed 
while a case is pending on appeal, then the appellate court must 
apply the law as it exists at the time the appeal is heard192 even if 
this effects a reversal of an earlier decision. This practice is consis­
tent with the declaratory function of the courtS.193 
On the other hand, Congress may not prescribe the outcome of 
a given case or group of cases without changing the underlying 
law,194 In its most distilled form, Klein stands for the proposition 
that Congress may not, within its constitutional limits, require the 
courts to attach a different effect to law than the courts have previ­
ously given it, without directly altering the law through legislation. 
This is exactly what Congress has done in section 27A, however. Of 
course, section 27A may be viewed simply as legislation establishing 
a section lOeb) statute of limitations. Reading parts (a) and (b) of 
section 27A together, though, reveals the clear congressional intent 
to address the outcome of a limited group of cases rather than pro­
vide a general statute of limitations for section lO(b) actions. 
This is not, by itself, a fatal flaw. The Robertson Court upheld 
the Northwest Timber Compromise despite the fact that the legisla­
tion at issue specifically addressed pending cases.195 The legislation 
at issue in Robertson, however, made general changes in the man­
agement policies for the federally-owned Northwest forests.196 In 
fact, by the "operation of the canon [of construction] that specific 
provisions qualify general ones,"197 the Northwest Timber Compro­
mise directly amended the underlying statutes. 
In comparison, Congress had no intention of changing the stat­
ute of limitations through section 27A, except in the cases of partic­
ular litigants. In effect, Congress sought to reach into the 
189. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 1. 
190. U.S. CaNST. art. III, §§ 1, 2. 
191. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988). 
192. See'United States v. Schooner Peggy,S U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). 
193. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535-36 (1991). 
194. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). The Robertson Court 
declined to rule on the principle established in Klein. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon 
Soc'y, 112 S. Ct. 1407, 1414 (1991). 
195. Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1413-14; see also Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 
10 F.3d 1485 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing the specific reference to a certain case in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
196. Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1413. 
197. Id. at 1414. 
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proceedings involving these particular litigants and change the out­
come of their cases, without changing the underlying law. Whereas 
the Northwest Timber Compromise changed federal law relating to 
the management of wildlife habitats, section 27A made no change 
in the law. Section 27A simply reversed cases which had been dis­
missed and allowed a more liberal statute of limitations in pending 
cases. The Lamp! rule, establishing a stringent and uniform section 
lO(b) statute of limitations, remains intact. The statute of limita­
tions applying to all other litigants remains as it was prior to the 
passage of section 27A. There is no practical difference between 
the congressional action in Klein and the congressional action in 
passing section 27A. 
In Klein, the Court examined legislation which changed the ap­
plication of a certain law in particular cases. Proponents of Con­
gress' action might have argued that such legislation effected a 
change in the law, which should have been dutifully applied by the 
courts. In the same way, proponents of section 27A insist that the 
"new" law should be applied by the courts. Yet section 27A has 
changed the law on the statute of limitations in section lO(b) cases 
no more than the congressional proviso in Klein changed the law 
regarding pardons for former rebels. Section 27A only changed the 
judicial treatment to be given to certain factual circumstances, i.e., 
the filing dates of claims under section lO(b). 
The plaintiffs who benefitted from section 27A present a very 
sympathetic case, considering that the rules of the game were 
changed after they had already commenced their lawsuits.198 To al­
low Congress, however, to help the plaintiffs in this way would ob­
literate the distinction between law-making and judicial decision­
making. The separation of powers doctrine prohibits the prescrip­
tion by Congress of a rule of decision for the courts. 
By reference to Klein, the Henderson court, and the other 
courts which adopted its reasoning or conclusions, applied the cor­
rect test to determine whether section 27A was compatible with 
separation of powers doctrine. The courts have, nevertheless, ar­
rived at the wrong answer. Section 27A fails the Klein test. Section 
27A is the prescription of a rule of decision by Congress, despite 
the fact that it came in the guise of legislation. 
198. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 370 
(1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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B. The Meaning of Hayburn's Case199 
Perhaps an even more difficult question, raised by section 
27A(b), is whether a case dismissed as time-barred and not pending 
on appeal can be restored by legislative action. This was the ques­
tion addressed by the Plaut court. In reaching its conclusion that 
section 27A(b) violates the separation of powers, the Plaut court 
relied heavily on Rayburn's Case. 
There are two problems with the Plaut court's reliance on 
Rayburn's Case to support its holding. First, the reported decision 
did not reach the constitutional question of whether another branch 
could review and overturn the final decision of a federal court. 200 
The question was rendered moot by the amendment to the benefits 
determination procedure which removed the courts from that pro­
cess.201 The reported decision simply announced the Court's inten­
tion to follow the example of the British courts in defining the 
duties and structure of the federal courts.202 No pronouncements 
were made as to the appropriateness of the pension application re­
view process. 
Second, the Plaut court attached a significance to Rayburn's 
Case that went far beyond the Supreme Court's recent statements 
concerning the case. The Supreme Court has indicated that the 
problem with the pension act at issue in Rayburn's Case was that it 
required the federal courts to carry out non-judicial work.203 The 
issue was not whether decisions of the federal courts were subject 
to review by another branch.204 
What Rayburn's Case makes clear is that the courts may not, in 
their capacity as courts, carry out the administrative work of the 
executive branch. Since it was the administrative character of the 
courts' assignment under the pension act which gave rise to the con­
stitutional objections, it cannot be said that Rayburn's Case stands 
for the repudiation of review of proper federal court decisions. Be­
cause Congress had instructed the courts to carry out an executive 
199. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). 
200. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 n.15 (1988). 
201. Rayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409-10. 
202. [d. at 413-14. For a detailed analysis of the "real" meaning of Rayburn's 
Case, see Marcus & Tier, supra note 176, at 534-41. 
203. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 402-03 (1989). 
204. Nor was the issue whether individual Justices could participate in the admin­
istrative proceedings under the pension act. This was a period of experimentation, bred 
by necessity, for the new federal government, testing by practice the means of carrying 
out the work of government where the Constitution left the boundaries uncertain. See 
id. at 398-99. 
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function, in Hayburn's Case there could be no proper federal court 
decisions to be reviewed. That was precisely the problem. 
The degree of concern about the improper assignment of an 
executive function to the courts, such as in Hayburn's Case, may be 
more difficult for a modem reader to appreciate than it was for a 
late eighteenth century citizen. At that time, there was widespread 
concern about separation of powers based in part on the notion that 
separation was necessary to establish the legitimacy of govern­
ments.205 Judicial and executive functions could not be joined in a 
legitimate government. This was the problem with the pension law 
at issue in Hayburn's Case. The courts were being asked to carry 
out the executive function, as commissioners rather than as judges. 
Our modem focus on the "checks and balances" theory of sep­
aration of powers might influence our reading of Hayburn's Case 
today. This understanding of the purpose of separated powers pre­
dominates, to the virtual exclusion of other separated powers theo­
ries.206 But in 1792, the issue was simply whether the courts could 
carry out a plainly executive function. The real concern raised by 
section 27A(b), however, is not that Congress has somehow 
charged the federal courts with non-judicial tasks by asserting the 
power to re-open closed cases. The real concern is that Congress 
has attempted to exercise the judicial power by seeking to reverse 
the fortunes of litigants in closed cases. 
While Hayburn's Case seems to be an inappropriate founda­
tion for the Plaut court's holding, it is only inappropriate to the 
extent that the Plaut court focused on the reviewability of judicial 
decisions. As shown above, this is not the real significance of 
Hayburn's Case. The Supreme Court has pointed out that 
Hayburn's Case really dealt with the independence of the judicial 
branch.207 
C. Formal vs. Functional Analysis 
A review of the Supreme Court's decisions in Chadha, Bow­
sher, Olson, and Mistretta leaves some question about the Court's 
view of the proper approach to separation of powers analysis.208 In 
light of this uncertainty, both the formal and functional perspectives 
205. WILLS, supra note 81, at 113-16. 
206. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text. 
207. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677-78 (1988). "The purpose of this limita­
tion is to help ensure the independence of the Judicial Branch ...." [d. 
208. See supra notes 85-106 and accompanying text. 
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on separation of powers should be considered. However, it seems 
clear that the majority of the courts of appeals have adopted a func­
tional analysis, epitomized by the Henderson court's acceptance of 
section 27A.209 
L The Formal Analysis 
The formal analysis must begin with a determination of the 
proper power of the legislative branch.210 Through its ability to al­
ter statutes which have been interpreted by the courts, the legisla­
tive branch reviews and controls the judiciary. It may change the 
law in response to the Court's construction of a particular stat­
ute.211 The key question raised by the enactment of section 27A is 
whether Congress has gone beyon~ its checking function and 
usurped the judicial power, thereby violating the separation of 
powers. 
If Congress had only amended an existing law specifying the 
statute of limitations in section 10(b) actions, or if Congress had 
established a new provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
which provided a statute of limitations for all section 10(b) cases, 
then it would be much easier to classify the congressional action as 
the exercise of its proper constitutional power. If such were the 
case, then Congress would have clearly changed the underlying law 
at issue, and would have satisfied the test articulated in both Klein 
and Robertson. Perhaps the best solution would have been the ex­
plicit establishment of a new claim for relief for plaintiffs in securi­
ties fraud cases, by the traditional legislative process. 
Section 27A was addressed, however, only to the group of 
cases which had been affected by the Lamp! decision. By enacting 
section 27A, Congress passed legislation which, in effect, over­
turned certain decisions of the judiciary.212 
The Supreme Court held in Wheeling Bridge and in Robertson 
that a change in the law directed at pending cases may be constitu­
tional. The change in the underlying law in Wheeling Bridge did not 
209. See supra notes 183-207 and accompanying text for an analysis of the courts 
of appeals' views on the constitutionality of § 27A. 
210. Redish & Cisar, supra note 78, at 475. 
211. E.g., the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) 
(codified in scattered sections of 42 u.s.c.). This legislation reversed a series of 
Supreme Court constructions narrowing the protection afforded by the civil rights stat­
utes. See generally Estrin, supra note 144. 
212. Part (b) of the legislation was specifically addressed to those cases that were 
already dismissed as time-barred. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-l(b) (Supp V 1993). 
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affect the plaintiff's right to recovery for past damages, i.e., those 
incurred before the law was changed .. The Wheeling Bridge legisla­
tion had a strictly prospective effect. In Robertson, the new rules 
outlined in the legislation at issue applied to future conduct in com­
pliance with the relevant environmental statutes. In neither case 
did the Court accept the notion that Congress could upset the judi­
ciary's disposition of claims in particular cases through legislation 
enacted solely for that purpose.213 Therefore, under a formal analy­
sis, section 27A is unconstitutional. 
2. The Functional Analysis 
The functional analysis involves a balancing of the legislative 
branch's power to change the law and the judiciary's ability to make 
independent decisions, with an emphasis on the ultimate impact of 
a certain piece of legislation on each branch's ability to carry out its 
prescribed function in the future. The Mistretta Court explained the 
functional concerns relating to the Judiciary: 
In cases specifically involving the Judicial Branch, we have ex­
pressed our vigilance against two dangers: first, that the Judicial 
Branch neither be assigned nor allowed "tasks that are more 
properly accomplished by [other] branches," and, second, that no 
provision of law "impermissibly threatens the institutional integ­
rity of the Judicial Branch."214 
The courts of appeals have failed to acknowledge the impact that 
congressional reversal of judicial decisions could have. While it is 
undisputed that a law can be given full retroactive effect by Con­
gress,215 it is another matter to allow legislation to reverse the 
courts' disposition of cases decided under the law applicable at the 
time of the decision. While Congress may reinstate claims against 
the United States through the enactment of legislation,216 it may 
not upset the expectations of private parties in a settled lawsuit. 
If the separation of powers is to serve us for the next two cen­
turies, the independence of the judicial branch must be maintained. 
The importance of this principle has been recognized since at least 
213. But cf United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (waiv­
ing the United States' defense of res judicata to permit rehearing on Sioux claims). In 
Sioux Nation, Congress acted both as legislative body and party to the case. 
214. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 383 (1989) (quoting Morrison v. 
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 680-81 (1988) and Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 
478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986), respectively). 
215. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988). 
216. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). 
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the time of Hayburn's Case. The power to direct the courts to hear 
certain cases which have already been dismissed certainly repre­
sents a threat to "the institutional integrity of the Judicial 
Branch."217 
"The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate 
Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish 
desirable objectives, must be resisted."218 While section 27A favors 
a class of sympathetic plaintiffs-those left without a remedy by the 
Lamp! Court-the broader implication of a rule such as section 
27A is a clearly unacceptable accretion of power to the legislative 
branch. It is not difficult to imagine other groups of influential liti­
gants, having lost in court, petitioning Congress for a "second 
chance." Section 27A survives neither the formal nor the func­
tional analyses.219 
CONCLUSION 
Viewed from any of the perspectives discussed in this Note, it 
would seem that Congress has overstepped its bounds. If Congress 
could not muster a consensus on the proper statute of limitations in 
section lO(b) cases then it should not be allowed to act to overturn 
a decision made by the Court in a particular class of cases. It is 
tempting to adopt the result which would allow these cases to be 
decided on their merits, and a sense of justice for the claimants ex­
erts a strong pressure to do so. If the integrity of the judicial branch 
is to be preserved for future decision-making, however, its power to 
render final decisions must be respected. 
Perhaps the judiciary turned its back on thousands of honest 
and hard working investors who were swindled and foreclosed from 
recovery by the Lamp! decision. While the Supreme Court's deci­
sion in Lamp!may have been unfair to plaintiffs with pending lOb-5 
claims, it would also be unfair to defendants who had successfully 
moved for dismissal under the rule of Lamp! to reverse the out­
come of their cases. The challenge of the separation of powers doc­
trine is to promote justice and the rule of law by protecting the 
realm of each branch from the encroachments of the others. An 
217. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 383 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. 
Schor, 978 U.S. 833, 851 (1986». 
218. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
219. For the opposite conclusion, at least as to § 27A(a), see Craig W. Palm, The 
Constitutionality of Section 27A of the Securities Exchange Act: Is Congress Rubbing 
Lampf the Wrong Way? 37 VILL. L. REv. 1213, 1308 (1992). 
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expeditious solution to the problem of a particular class of plaintiffs 
can bring much greater uncertainty to all future litigants. 
What makes this a difficult case is that certain plaintiffs had 
rights taken away from them by the Court, and Congress simply 
acted to restore those rights. Nonetheless, the structural nature of 
the separation of powers requires that Congress be restrained from 
usurping judicial power. Section 27A(a) is unconstitutional because 
it prescribes a rule of decision for the courts without changing the 
underlying law any more than Congress changed the law in the 
Klein case. Part (b) is unconstitutional because it threatens the in­
dependence of the judiciary. The courts focusing on section 27A(a) 
have used the correct test, but reached the wrong result. The Plaut 
court, which focused on part (b), reached the correct result, but 
through reliance on the wrong analysis. 
John D. McNally 
